Anti-Corruption in Traditional and Modern China: A Comparison of Institutional Designs and Legal Frameworks.
- UCL Law for All Society
- Mar 14
- 23 min read
Updated: Mar 15
By Cathy Liu
I. Introduction
Philosophically grounded in Confucian idea of “ruling for the people” (minben sixiang, 民本思想), “honesty and uprightness” (廉洁奉公) has been deeply ingrained into the “DNA” of Chinese political ethics, despite successive dynastic transitions. Following Xun Zi’s famous metaphor of “The ruler is the boat, and the common people are the water; water can carry the boat, but it can also overturn it” (君者，舟也；庶人者，水也; 水能载舟，亦能覆舟), emperors of newly established dynasties were acutely aware that a corrupt bureaucracy could lead to social unrest and ultimately subversion of the regime. Historical experiences such as the Chen Sheng and Wu Guang Uprising during the late Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE) further served as a lasting warning to later rulers. Such awareness contributed to the continuous institutional development of anti-corruption practices throughout imperial China.
Anti-corruption efforts did not end with the collapse of imperial rule. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China (ROC), proposed the Five-Yuan System and established the Control Yuan (jiancha yuan, 监察院) as the institution to supervise central and local governmental officials. The Control Yuan has maintained its supervisory role following the ROC’s loss of Mainland China and the Kuomintang’s retreat to Taiwan, and continues to function to the present day despite demands for its abolition. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chairman Mao Zedong launched the Three-Anti Campaign in 1951 (sanfan yundong, 三反运动) and the Five-Anti Campaign in 1952 (wufan yundong, 五反运动) to eradicate bureaucratic corruption within the party and state apparatus. Since inauguration in 2012, President Xi has further intensified anti-corruption efforts through the “Tigers and Flies” campaign (paiying dahu, 打虎拍蝇) at domestic levels, and through international operations like “Fox Hunt”（liehu xingdong, 猎狐行动） and “Sky-network” (tianwang xingdong, 天网行动).
This article compares the institutional and legal frameworks of anti-corruption in traditional and modern China, with a particular focus on the eighteenth century Qing dynasty (1644-1912) and the PRC under President Xi’s leadership. It examines two dimensions of anti-corruption efforts targeting governmental officials: 1) investigation initiation mechanisms; 2) corruption laws. Challenging the conventional binary of tradition and modernity, it shows how contemporary anti-corruption institutions are not a radical rupture from the past imperial governance but inherit both the logic and design.
II. Initiation Mechanism: Who and How?
While the mechanisms of initiating investigation into corrupt official greatly differ in traditional and modern China, both systems rely on a combination of centralized top-down supervision and bottom-up reporting from the general public. The initiation procedures applied during the mid-Qing dynasty evolved from the institutionalization of impeachment in the Tang dynasty (618 CE to 907 CE), whose rudimentary form can be traced back to the Han dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE).
II. I. Initiation Mechanism in the mid-Qing Dynasty
The Censorate, named as Yushi Tai (御史台), was established as the central institution responsible for supervising and impeaching officials in the Han dynasty. Censors dispatched by the emperor were permitted to initiate impeachment on the basis of local hearsay (fengwen zoushi, 风闻奏事), effectively gathering information from what they saw and heard from the local communities. This bottom-up practice was adopted by censors in the Tang dynasty as the primary mechanism to “accept accusations” from the general population and was further strengthened during the mid-Qing Kangxi period.
Ducha Yuan (都察院) replaced Yushi Tai as the Censorate in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and continued to function as the central supervisory institution throughout the Qing dynasty. Despite dynastic transitions, impeachment independence (duli tanhe, 独立弹劾) remained institutionally guaranteed as censors at different administrative levels were permitted to directly report to the emperor on their own without approval from the chief censor.
Written impeachment (zhanghe, 章劾), first institutionalized in the Tang dynasty as a key stage of impeachment process, was typically submitted either as a formal memorial (tiben, 题本), which would be passed through multiple bureaucratic layers before reaching the emperor, or as a confidential memorial (zouzhe, 奏折) directly delivered to the emperor. Whereas formal memorials were banned during the Guangxu period, confidential memorials, first adopted during the Shunzhi period, were further strengthened by the Kangxi Emperor. Besides the written form, oral impeachment (mianhe, 面劾) was also utilised throughout the Qing dynasty.
Since their proliferation in the Tang dynasty, impeachment memorials (zhuangzou he, 状奏劾) had been strictly formalized, following extremely stringent formatting requirements. For example, censors must end the memorials with deferential phrases like “I humbly request Your Majesty’s enlightened judgement” (伏乞皇上明鉴). Those violating the sophisticated formatting principles would be severely penalized.
II. II. Initiation Mechanism in the PRC
In the PRC, the initiation of anti-corruption investigations differs between politburo members and local government officials. While the reporting and investigation procedures for the highest-ranking leaders of the central government remain mysterious, anti-corruption investigations at the provincial and municipal levels rely on various forms of supervision. These include regular inspections conducted by the Inspection Teams (xunshi zu, 巡视组) under the Commission of Discipline Inspection (CDI) (jilü jiancha weiyuanhui, 纪律检查委员会) at all levels, which examine administrative records, financial accounts, correspondence, and telephone communications of local governments; financial audits carried out by external auditing agencies; and public reporting systems through which ordinary citizens can submit complaints and allegations of corruption (qunzhong jübao, 群众举报).
Prior to 2018, all the cases involving Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members gathered by the Inspection Teams, auditing agencies and from ordinary people would be reported to the Municipal, Provincial or Central CDI for further investigation. Instances of corruption not involving CCP members would be investigated by the Ministry of Supervision (MS) (Bureau of Supervision at local level, BS) (jiancha bu/jiancha jü, 监察部/监察局). After the collected facts were sorted out by the CDI or the Supervision branch, the cases were sent to the Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau (ABB) (fan tanwu huilu jü, 反贪污贿赂局) of the People’s Procuratorates (PP) (renmin jiancha yuan, 人民检察院) at the corresponding level for formal investigation. Police departments at all levels were also involved in investigation of corruption crimes committed by non-state workers. Dubbed as “controlling the waters with many dragons”, the institutional design of corruption investigation before 2018 was a decentralized system involving multiple stakeholders, thus resulted in many confusions and conflicts related to authority of supervision.
The enactment of National Supervision Law (NSL) in 2018 simplified the institutional design and effectively centralized the supervisory and investigative power. Accordingly, the Central CDI and the Ministry of Supervision were merged into the National Supervision Commission (NSC) (guojia jiancha weiyuanhui, 国家监察委员会). The ABB was also removed from the Supreme People’s Procuratorates (SPP), with all its investigation power over corruption cases transferred to the NSC. At local levels, the CDI and BS were also merged into the corresponding municipal or provincial Supervision Commission (SC), with the investigative power transferred to it from the local ABB. After merging, the NSC now exercises both supervision and investigation power overall all public employees, including government officials, leaders of state-owned enterprises and heads of public educational institutions, be it CCP nor non-CCP members.
Nevertheless, there is still controversy over the overlapping jurisdiction of the SC and the SPP at all levels. Although the 2018 NSL took away the SPP’s power to investigate corruption cases, the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) entitled it to investigate all duty-related crimes committed by state workers or public officials, which include corruption cases. Given this overlap, the SPP issued a notice on the 2018 amendment of CPL, clarifying its investigative authority by listing out 14 crimes falling under its jurisdiction; in response, the NSC issued an analogous document – the 2021 Regulation, listing out six categories of crimes within its jurisdiction. Determining the appropriate application of investigative powers in cases that fall under both categories is thus a problem requiring systematic resolution, as the NSC and SPP have different regulatory standards on access to lawyers, evidence collection, and compulsory measures. This controversy applies to SC and PP at local levels as well.
II. III. Comparative Summary
Overall, despite differences in institutional arrangements, the initiation mechanisms in both traditional and modern China unfold through three essential stages. The first stage involves the regular supervisions of officials through bottom-up reporting mechanisms. Specifically, both the practice of impeachment based on hearsay adopted by dispatched censors in earlier dynasties and the Inspection Teams in the PRC collect information about officials at the grassroots level. The second stage involves the submission of the collected information. While censors in earlier dynasties were required to submit impeachment memorials in fixed and formalized formats, all materials collected during the supervisory stage in the PRC are submitted to the NSC (or SC at local levels) for further verification and investigation. The final stage consists of formal investigations of accused officials. In earlier dynasties, investigative responsibility was typically assigned to the Board of Punishments (xingbu, 刑部), as the Censorate primarily exercised supervisory and corrective power. In the PRC, however, after the enactment of 2018 NSL, the NSC assumed the responsibility of all stages of corruption controls, from supervision to investigation.
III. Corruption Laws: Charges and Punishments
III. I. Corruption Laws in the mid-Qing Dynasty
Drawing on the legal traditions of the Tang dynasty, as codified in the Laws of the Tang Dynasty and Annotations (Tang Lü Shu Yi, 唐律疏议), the Qing Legal Code classified illegal acts committed by governmental officials into public offences (gongzui, 公罪) and private offences (sizui, 私罪). Public offences referred to “unlawful deeds that were committed in the course of an official’s professional or personal capacity”, such as “failure to investigate, tardiness and negligence”. Private offences were committed either in an “official’s professional capacity as a member of imperial bureaucracy” or “in his personal capacity as a defender of his individual and familial interests”. Different from the unintentional misuse of power in public offences, private offences were “intentionally carried out in selfish pursuit of personal gains”. Because of this, private offences were more severely punished than public ones. As all corrupt acts were viewed as intentionally committed for personal advantage, corruption was formally categorized as a private offence in the Great Qing Legal Code (Da Qing Lü Li, 大清律例). The charge of corruption was further classified into five offences under the subheading of “acceptance of spoils” (shouzang, 收赃), each with its own scale of punishment (see Table 1). Both the bribe giver and receiver are considered.
Table 1. (The offences and corresponding punishments of corruption charge in the 18th Qing Dynasty (Kangxi-Yongzheng-Qianlong period):
Number | Offence | Sentence |
1 | Accepting a Bribe Exchange for a Lawful or Unlawful Favor (guanli shoucai, 官吏收财): -A lawful favor is the receiving of compensation for performance of a legal result, but in which the means used to seek the result were illegal.-An unlawful favor is the receiving of compensation for an illegal result.
| -Punishment scale for unlawful favor was more serious than lawful favor: one tael of money for lawful favor would be punished with 60 blows, while one tael of money for unlawful favor would be punished for 70 blows (zhang, 杖). -Punishment received was calculated on the basis of monetary value of the bribe: for every additional five taels received, blows of heavy bamboo increased; if bribe reached 80 taels, a maximum sentence of strangulation would be applied after the Assizes, i.e. the investigation and judication of corruption cases led by dispatched officials from higher levels of government sent to lower levels of jurisdiction. |
2 | Influence Peddling (zuozang zhizui, 坐赃致罪): officials received a type of inducement, regardless of whether favors were asked or exchanges were made. | -Punishment scale: one tael of money would be punished for 20 blows of light bamboos (chi, 笞) -since it was not considered as a capital crime, the most severe form was limited to 500 taels of money for influence peddling and would be punished through 100 blows of the heavy bamboo alongside three years of penal servitude. |
3 | Extortion (lesuo, 勒索): officials took advantage of their power to obtain money or other property illegally from people under their authority via violence, threat or force. Examples included extortionate loans (coercive lending or borrowing at an unfair rate) (suojie, 索借), extortionate purchases (buy goods at price lower than market rate) (lemai, 勒买), extortionate sales (lemai, 勒卖), and delayed payment. | -If the extortion only involved verbal violence, then the punishment scale would be same as with “bribery in exchange for unlawful favor”. -If the extortion involved physical violence, then the punishment scale would be harsher. -If the extortion only involved delayed payment of goods and services, then the punishment scale would be the same as with influence peddling with additional compensation to the owner for the unauthorized use of property. -If the extortion was committed by the representative, followers, or household members of the governmental official, then the culprits and the official himself, who failed to prevent the crime, would be punished at same levels. |
4 | Soliciting Unauthorized Funds (kelian, 苛敛): collecting money in the form of customary fees, surcharges, or “donations”. | -Punishment scale depended on sum of the unauthorized funds: if the sum was small, the perpetrator would receive 60 blows of bamboo; if the sum was large, then punishment was according to the scale of influence peddling. -Punishment scale depended on purpose of collecting unauthorized funds: if collected for personal advantage, then punishment would be according to the scale of bribery in exchange for a lawful favor; if it was falsely claimed by the perpetrator that the fund had been levied for the public good, then sentencing would be done according to the heavier punishment scale of bribery in exchange for an unlawful favor. |
5 | Offering, Negotiating and Handling Bribes (xinghui，行贿): three types of people were explicitly include under these provision. 1) Negotiators (shuoshi ren，说事人), who helped set the terms of transactions; 2) Handlers （guoqian ren，过钱人）: transferer of money and goods; 3) Briber (xinghui ren, 行贿人) | -Punishment for the bribe giver was in general lighter than bribe handler, but similar to the scale for influence peddling. -If the giver bribed by threats, fraud or violence, givers would be exempted from punishment and only receivers would be punished. -For intermediaries, including negotiators and handlers: a maximum penalty of 100 blows of heavy bamboo and two years of penal servitude would be enforced; however, if intermediary received compensations, they would be punished at the same level with the receiver (tongke, 同苛); if more than one intermediary was involved, the originator of the plan would receive the greatest punishment; if a bribe was extorted through threats and violence, then only the receiver would be punished. |
(Sources for Table 2: Park N. E. (1997) 'Corruption in Eighteenth-Century China', The Journal of Asian Studies, 56(4), 967-1005, Association for Asian Studies ; Great Qing Legal Code, Available at: https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/f8acb91f-e83e-46a8-91ad-ebed8535f3cd/content ）
III. II. Corruption Laws in the PRC
Although the categories of “public offences” and “private offences” present in the Qing Code are no longer used, a similar underlying distinction, based on whether acts involve intentional pursuit of personal gain, continues to define corruption offences under the Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China (zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa, 中华人民共和国刑法). Specifically, if an official’s misuse of public power results in personal enrichment, it is charged as a Crime of Embezzlement and Bribery (tanwu huilu zui, 贪污贿赂罪) (The PRC Criminal Law, Chapter VIII); if it results only in public loss but without personal benefit to the official, it is charged as a Crime of Dereliction of Duty (duzhi zui, 渎职罪) (The PRC Criminal Law, Chapter IX) rather than as corruption. Crimes of Embezzlement and Bribery are further classified into thirteen specific corruption offences.
In terms of sentencing criteria and scale, several important changes were introduced in the Criminal Amendment Act (IX) (1 November 2015) and the Criminal Amendment Act (XII) (1 March 2024). Act (IX) replaced the previous “amount-based” standard for corruption sentencing with a standard based on “amount or circumstances”, adjusted the sentencing range accordingly, and strengthened punishments for bribe-givers. Act (XII) further intensified the punishment of bribe-giving offences committed by state units.
Table 2. (The offences and corresponding punishments of corruption charge in China under President Xi’s leadership):
Number | Offence | Sentence |
1 | Embezzlement (tanwu zui, 贪污罪) (Article 382, 383, 394): State functionary, by taking advantage of his/her office, illegally takes possession of public funds or property. | Article 383 (1997 Version): Embezzlement > 100,000 yuan: no less than 10-year imprisonment to life imprisonment, and may also involve confiscation of property; if circumstances are especially serious, death penalty and confiscation of property; 5,000 < embezzlement < 50,000 yuan: sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of no less than 5 years but no more than 7 years, and may also involve confiscation of property; if circumstances are serious, imprisonment of less than 7 years but no more than 10 years; if the value of embezzled funds is between 5,000 and 10,000 yuan and is accompanied by a genuine show of repentance, then mitigation of punishment. Embezzlement < 5,000 yuan, if circumstances are serious, then 2 years of imprisonment; if circumstances are minor, then administrative sanctions. Article 383 (2015 Amendment Act (IX)): more simplified and operational sentencing range, with tiered punishment scales within the previous broad category of high monetary amounts and serious circumstances (>100,000 yuan, >10 years of imprisonment) Relatively large embezzlement or other relatively serious circumstances: less than 3 years of imprisonment or detention, and fine; Huge embezzlement or other serious circumstances, imprisonment lasting more than 3 years but less than 10 years, fine, and confiscation of property; Especially huge embezzlement or other especially serious circumstances, 10 or more years of imprisonment up to life imprisonment, fine and confiscation of property; where the amount is especially large and people and nation suffer large loss, life imprisonment or death penalty could be applied, with confiscation of property. |
2 | Misappropriation of public funds (nuoyong gongkuan zui, 挪用公款罪) (Article 384): State functionary, by taking advantage of his/her position, misappropriates public funds for personal use illegal activities, profit-making activities, or simply not return within three months. | Article (384): No more than 5 years of imprisonment or criminal detention. If circumstances are serious, no less than 5 years of imprisonment. If amount is huge and unrecoverable, no less than 10 years or life imprisonment. |
3 | Acceptance of bribes (shouhui zui, 受贿罪) (Article 385, 386, 388): -State functionary, by taking advantage of his position, 1) extorts or 2) illegally accepts money or property from another person and in return secures benefits for that person. -State functionary, by taking advantage of his power or position, secures illegitimate benefits for an entrusting person, and extorts or accepts the entrusting person’s money or property. -Whether the benefits secured for another person are lawful or unlawful does not affect the establishment of the crime of bribery. -Whether the benefits sought for another person are actually realized does not affect the determination of the crime of bribery. | Article (386): Punished in accordance with the provisions of Article 383 (amended in the 2015 Amendment Act (IX)). If bribe is extorted, harsher punishment. |
4 | Acceptance of bribe taken by a unit (danwei shouhui zui, 单位受贿罪) (Article 387): State institution extorts or illegally accepts another person’s money or property from another person and in return secure benefits for that person (including secret acceptance of off-the-book rebates or service charges). | Article 387 (2020 Version): If circumstances are serious, the institution shall be fined; and the person directly in charge shall be sentenced to imprisonment of no more than 5 years or criminal detention.
Article 387 (2024 Amendment Act (XII)): If circumstances are serious, the institution shall be fined; and the person directly in charge shall be sentenced to imprisonment of no more than 3 years or criminal detention. If circumstances are especially serious, more than 3 years but no more than 10 years of imprisonment. |
5 | Accepting bribes through influence (liyong yingxiangli shouhui zui, 利用影响力受贿罪) (Article 388-1) (added in the 2009 Amendment Act (VII)): A close relative of or anyone who has a close relationship with the state functionary, by taking advantage of his power or position, secures illegitimate benefits for an entrusting person, and extorts or accepts the entrusting person’s money or property. | Article 388-1 (added in the 2009 Amendment Act (VII)): If relatively large monetary amount or other relatively serious circumstances, no more than 3 years of imprisonment or criminal detention, and fine. If huge monetary amount or other serious circumstances, more than 3 years but no more than 7 years of imprisonment, and fine. If especially huge monetary amount or especially serious circumstances, more than 7 years of imprisonment, and fine or confiscation of property. |
6 | Offering bribes (xinghui zui, 行贿罪) (Article 389, 390, 390-1): - Applicable to any individual who, for the purpose of illegitimate benefits, gives money or property (including rebates or service charges) to a state functionary. -If money or property is offered through extortion, then it is not regarded as offering bribe. *Bribing someone with influence (dui you yingxianglideren xinghuizui, 对有影响力的人行贿罪) (Article 390-1) (added in the 2015 Amendment Act (IX)): - Applicable to any individual who, for the purpose of illegitimate benefits, offers bribes to a close relative or anyone who has a close relationship with the state official. | Article 390 (2015 Amendment Act (IX)): No more than 5 years of imprisonment. If circumstances are serious or cause heavy losses, no less than 5 years but no more than 10 years of imprisonment. If circumstances are especially serious, no less than 10 years of imprisonment, and fined or confiscation of property.
Article 390 (2024 Amendment Act (XII): -No more than 3 years of imprisonment or criminal detention. If circumstances serious or cause huge loss, more than 3 years but less than 10 years of imprisonment. If circumstances are especially serious or cause especially huge loss, punishment of no less than 10 years of imprisonment up to life imprisonment, and fine or confiscation of property. Article 390-1 (added in the 2015 Amendment Act (IX) targeting bribing someone with influence): If offering bribes, then no more than 3 years of imprisonment or criminal detention, and fine.-If circumstances serious or huge loss, more than 3 years but no more than 10 years of imprisonment, and fine. If circumstances especially serious or cause especially large loss, more than 7 years but no more than 10 years of imprisonment, and fine. If bribe-offering involves the following circumstances*, then harsher punishment. |
7 | Offering bribes to unit (dui danwei xinghui zui, 对单位行贿罪)(Article 391): Applicable to any individual who, for the purpose of securing illegitimate benefits, gives money or property to a state institution (include rebates or service charges).
| Article 391 (2020 Amendment): No more than 3 years of imprisonment or criminal detention, and fined. Article 391 (after 2024 Amendment Act (XII)): No more than 3 years of imprisonment or criminal detention; if circumstances are serious, more than 3 years but less than 7 years of imprisonment, and fine. |
8 | Introducing a bribe (jieshao huilu zui, 介绍贿赂罪) (Article 392): Applicable to any individual who introduces a bribe to a state functionary. | Article 392: No more than 3 years of imprisonment or criminal detention. |
9 | Offering of bribes by a unit (danwei xinghui zui, 单位行贿罪) (Article 393): A state institution offers bribes for the purpose of securing illegitimate benefits (include rebates or service charges).
| Article 393 (2015 Amendment Act (IX)): If circumstances are serious, the institution shall be fined, and the persons who are directly in charge or/and directly responsible for the offences shall be sentenced to no more than 5 years of imprisonment or criminal detention.
Article 393 (2024 Amendment Act (XII)): If circumstances are serious, the institution shall be fined, and the persons who are directly in charge or/and directly responsible for the offences shall be sentenced to no more than 3 years of imprisonment. If circumstances are especially serious, more than 3 years but no more than 10 years of imprisonment, and fine. Those making illegal gains derived from bribing shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the provisions of Article 389 and 390. |
10 | Unexplained sources of property (jüe caichan laiyuan buming zui, 巨额财产来源不明罪) (Article 395-1): State functionary whose property or expenditure obviously exceeds his lawful income. If sources of property cannot be proven to be legitimate, the portion exceeding lawful income is regarded as illegal gains. | Article 395-1: No more than 5 years of imprisonment or criminal detention. If difference of income and property is especially large, more than 5 years but no more than 10 years of imprisonment. The portion of property exceeding the guilty party’s lawful income shall be recovered. |
11 | Undeclare savings outside the territory of China (yinman jingwai cunkuan zui, 隐瞒境外存款罪) (Article 395-2): State functionary fails to declare to the State his bank savings outside the territory of China. | Article 395-2: If amount of saving is relatively large yet undeclared to the State, no more than 2 years of imprisonment or criminal detention. If circumstances are relatively minor, administrative sanctions. |
12 | Dividing up State-owned assets in secret (sifen guoyou zichan zui, 私分国有资产罪) (Article 396-1): A state institution divides up state-owned assets in secret among individuals of the unit. | Article 396-1: If amount is relatively large, the persons who are directly in charge of the given unit or/and the persons who are directly responsible for the offences shall be sentenced to no more than 3 years of imprisonment or criminal detention and will also incur a fine. If the amount is huge, then more than 3 years but no more than 7 years of imprisonment and fine. |
13 | Secret divvying up of fines or confiscated money or property (sifen famo caiwu zui, 私分罚没财物罪) (Article 396-2): A state institution divides up fined or confiscated money or property, which should be turned over to the State, among individuals of the unit in secret | Article 396-2: Punished in accordance with the Article 396-1. |
*List of circumstances relevant to ascertaining the severity of sentence under crime no. 6 in table (Offering of bribes (行贿罪) (Article 389, 390, 390-1))
(1) Repeated bribery or bribery involving multiple recipients.
(2) Bribery directed at state officials.
(3) Bribery in the context of key national or major state projects.
(4) Bribery for the purpose of securing appointment, promotion, or adjustment in official rank.
(5) Bribery of supervisory, administrative enforcement, or judicial personnel.
(6) Bribery occurring within sensitive regulatory sectors, including environmental protection, public finance, financial regulation, workplace safety, food and drug regulation, disaster relief, social security, education, or healthcare, accompanied by other unlawful or criminal conduct.
(7) The use of illicit proceeds to finance bribery.
(Sources for Table 2: 中华人民共和国刑法2020版，中华人民共和国刑法修正案（九）， 中华人民共和国刑法修正案（十二），贪污贿赂犯罪立案标准，Criminal Law of People's Republic of China, Criminal Amendment Act (IX)，Criminal Amendment Act (XII)，http://lawyeredu.pkulaw.cn:8091/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=11&id=47，https://www.allbrightlaw.com/CN/10475/994456f8a180289a.aspx ; All the provisions in the PRC's Criminal Law are paraphrased into a simplified, accessible form by the author of this article.)
III. III Comparison
The legal categories of corruption offences in the PRC’s Criminal Law largely correspond to those in the Qing Code. "Unexplained sources of property" and "Undeclared savings outside the territory of China" are the only two corruption offences under the PRC’s Criminal Law that have no counterparts in the Qing Code. Offences under both legal systems can be broadly divided into Acceptance of Bribes, Misuse of Public Funds, Extortion, Offering of Bribes, and Introducing Bribes, with minor variations in naming and ordering. Under the PRC Law, acceptance of bribe is further divided into acceptance by individuals and acceptance by units, while offering of bribes is similarly classified into offering by individual and by unit.
Influence peddling (i.e. receiving inducement but not seeking any favor in exchange) was listed as a separate offence under the Qing Code, whereas under the PRC Law, it is subsumed as a form of acceptance of bribes (see Number 2 Table 1; Number 3 Table 2).
Misuse of public funds was termed “soliciting unauthorized funds” under the Qing Code, whereas under the PRC Law, it is more specifically categorized into offences of “misappropriation of public funds”, “dividing up state-owned assets in secret” and “dividing up in secret the fines or confiscated money or property” (see Number 4 Table 1; Number 2, 12, 13 Table 2).
Extortion was listed as a separate offence under the Qing Code, whereas under the PRC Law, it is subsumed as a form of Acceptance of Bribes (see Number 3 Table 1; Number 3 Table 2). Despite ordering differences, both codes adopt a similar approach toward extortion in bribery exchanges. Harsher punishments apply when bribes are obtained through extortion, namely by forcing another person to offer money or property through verbal, financial or physical coercion (see Number 3 Table 1; Number 5 Table 2). Conversely, where a bribe is offered under extortion, the giver is not punished (see Number 5 Table 1; Number 6 Table 2).
Although sharing similar a underlying logic, the offences, convictions and sentencing under the PRC Law still differ from the Qing Code in various ways.
(1) Acceptance of Bribe:
Under the Qing Code, if extortion or illegal acceptance of bribery was committed by relatives or anyone with close relationships with the state official, the official himself would be punished at the same levels with the culprit for failing to prevent the crime as the superior officer or the head of the household (see Number 3, Table 1). According to provisions under the PRC Law, however, only the culprit will be punished (see Number 5, Table 2). Yet in actual legal practices, whether the official has the knowledge of or participates in the culprit’s bribery activities (e.g. close relative of an official accepts money from an entrusting and the official use his power to meet the demands of that entrusting person) is an important criterion of whether the official himself is convicted of corruption offences. In other words, when bribes are accepted by individuals closely related to the official, the Qing Code could punish the official on moral grounds regardless of the official’s actual participation, whereas under the PRC Law, punishment generally requires the official’s material involvement.
(2) Offering of Bribes
Under the Qing Code, punishment of bribe givers was generally lighter than punishment of receivers. For one tael of inducement, the giver would be punished with 20 blows of light bamboo while the receiver would be punished with 60 blows of heavy bamboo (see Number 5, Table 1). In contrast, amendment acts for the PRC Law have progressively imposed harsher penalties on briber givers, aiming to address the longstanding phenomenon of “heavy punishment for bribery-taking but light punishment for bribery-giving” in China (see Number 6, Table 2). For example, the 2024 Amendment Act (XII) raised the maximum sentencing for “offering bribes to (state) units” from no more than 3 years of imprisonment or criminal detention to up to 7 years.
(3) Introducing Bribes
Under the Qing Code, whether the intermediary facilitating a bribe received compensation was a core determinant criterion for the sentencing of said intermediary. If compensation was received, then the intermediary would be punished at the same level as the bribe receiver (see Number 5, Table 1). In contrast, under the PRC’s Criminal Law, whether the intermediary benefits from introducing the bribe is not considered, at least in the provision, as a sentencing criterion. The punishment is no more than 3 years of imprisonment or criminal detention; a relatively light sentence compared to bribe-acceptance and offering (see Number 8, Table 2).
(4) Sentencing and Punisment
The sentencing provisions under the Qing Code were structured according to the specific monetary amount involved. In the PRC, prior to the 2015 Amendment Act (IX), sentencing was likewise largely determined by the monetary amount involved. After the amendment, specific monetary thresholds were replaced by broader categories (“relatively large”, “large”, “especially large”), and the seriousness of circumstances became a separate criterion regardless of monetary amount (see Number 1, Table 2). As for the form of punishment, the Qing Code relied primarily on corporeal punishment, whereas the PRC’s Law mainly employs imprisonment or detention, as well as fines and confiscation of property.
IV. Conclusion
“Cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state, and bringing the peace to the world” (修身齐家治国平天下) has long been regarded as the ideal moral trajectory of male officials in the Chinese political traditions. Accordingly, institutional and legal efforts to combat corruption have been consistently implemented and strengthened throughout China’s 2000-year of history. Focusing specifically on the mid-Qing dynasty and the PRC under President Xi's leadership, this article demonstrates the historical continuities in the underlying logic of anti-corruption design, as well as specific variations in institutional arrangements and legal provisions from traditional to modern China.
Despite similar initiation mechanisms and legal categorizations of corruption offences, anti-corruption power in contemporary China is more institutionally centralized than in Qing. Corruption offences are also more specifically classified under the PRC’s Criminal Law than was the case under the Qing Code. Regarding sentencing and punishment, while sentencing in Qing was largely scaled according to the monetary amount involved, the latest PRC Criminal Law treats the “circumstances” of a case as an independent sentencing criterion in parallel with monetary amount. Punishments for offering bribes have become more severe, whereas penalties for introducing bribes become lighter, and corporeal punishment, which was common in Qing, has been entirely abolished now.
Overall, this article challenges the binary division between tradition and modernity in the legal realm and shows that law is not a static set of rules but a dynamic process that continuously evolves alongside broader historical and social circumstances. Future research could investigate the political purpose of anti-corruption, for example, how leaders use anti-corruption as a cause to eradicate political rivalries and consolidate their ruling power. Conditions for mitigation is another topic that merits in-depth investigations. Above all, the contents discussed in this article are based exclusively on formal legislation and do not touch upon the issues of legal implementation in the Chinese context. Thus, more research on judicial cases could be conducted to understand how corruption is sentenced in different real-life scenarios in China.
Supplementary Sources:
Deng, J. (2018) ‘The National Supervision Commission: A new anti-corruption model in China’ International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 52, pp.58-73.
Guo, Z. (2023) 'Anti-corruption mechanisms in China after the supervision law', Journal of Economic Criminology, 1, p.100002.
Hamzaçebi, S. (2026) 'The Evolution of China's Anti-Corruption Policies: From Ancient China to the Modern China', Gümüşhane University Journal of Social Sciences, 17(1), pp.142-154.
Ling, S. (2011) 'Construction of anti-corruption institutions and culture in traditional China and its implications for modern China', Social Sciences in China, 32(4), pp.162-175.
Park, N.E. (1997) 'Corruption in eighteenth-century China', The Journal of Asian Studies, 56(4), pp.967-1005.
Wang, Q. (2016) 'Four Key Periods in the Development of the Impeachment System in Ancient China.” Journal of the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, 3
Edited by Artyom Timofeev
Image sources: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-39586148 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvv5bLnFUEg
Comments