The USA's Parking Spot: Europe
- UCL Law for All Society
- 2 days ago
- 4 min read
By Velimira Ekova
The Iranian strikes on U.S. assets in the Middle East have exposed a critical vulnerability of US military bases abroad.
This, however, does not appear to be a blunder on the US’s part.
Before the onset of conflicts in Iran, US military equipment began appearing in airports across several European and Arab nations.
In Europe, Bulgaria opened its airspace and airports for US military aircrafts, suspending civilian travel for several days. Switzerland, Scotland and Romania have provided similar resources to the US Airforce. The implications, and consequences, of this cannot be reversed.
Notably, Germany has considered converting its previously regional, civilian airport, Rostock-Laage, into a military base. While presented as a neutral logistical manoeuvre, unrelated to conflicts in the Middle East, I do not believe this to be true.
By blurring the line between a civilian object and a dual-use military objective, these agreements create significant domestic and international liability. This policy suggests that safekeeping is a legal fiction that risks converting essential civilian infrastructure into legitimate targets under international law. Furthermore, it renders these nations, aiding US military forces, no longer neutral in said international conflicts, making them, and these civilian areas, legitimate targets in potential military escalations.
The legal status of a civilian airport is not static; it is defined by its function. Under Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2), ‘a military object is one which by its nature, location purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total, or partial, destruction, capture or neutralisation offers a definite military advantage’.
While a commercial terminal is civilian by nature, hence a neutral, non-military object, the act of safekeeping combat vessels fundamentally converts its use. Once an airport houses assets capable of engaging in military conflict, it becomes beneficial for a state, especially a smaller one such as Iran, to critically target it in the name of destroying enemy vessels.
Furthermore, aiding US military interest in this way may constitute a breach of the Principle of Precautions under Article 58. States are obligated to avoid locating military objectives near densely populated areas. By intentionally allowing US military vessels to come and go as they please, states place a target on civilian zones, putting the general populus at risk.
This shift is often executed through constitutional backdoors. In many states, the Executive branch utilises basing agreements or Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) to bypass parliamentary war powers.
In Germany, this raises questions regarding Articles 24(2) of the Basic Law. This can be used to argue in support of US use of German civilian infrastructure for they are forsaking their sovereign powers by entering a system of mutually collective security with the USA by supporting their interests in the Middle East, which should, given their close relationship, support Germany itself. However, the Article refers to such actions aiding in the consequential ‘bringing about of lasting peace among the nations of the world’.
Masking a military basing agreement as logistical safekeeping and neutrality is an attempt to avoid the reality of the co-belligerent status of these geopolitical relations. Furthermore, the Hague Convention V, Article 17 outlines that neutrality cannot be maintained if the neutral engages in a hostile act against a belligerent or commits an act of favour towards a belligerent.
Safekeeping of an ally’s combat assets, as they are actively engaged in warfare in nearby states, is not a neutral act. Ministers can deny involvement and claim neutrality, as Bulgaria’s defence minister attempted, but it does not remove from the fact that by offering space for something as simple as refuelling they convert civilian infrastructure into proxy military bases and attempt to poorly deceive their population into believing themselves innocent of foreign interference.
Bahrain, the UAE, Kuwait and Oman have already faced consequences to their aiding of US military interest in the Middle East. Iran did not hesitate to return fire to US bases. Some, such as Kuwait, refused to aid the US offensive to Iran directly yet were still targeted for their co-belligerent involvement in the conflict.
What does this mean for the European states offering the same, arguably, minimal support?
Though it is unlikely war with Iran would escalate in such a way, there is no guarantee Europe will stay conflict free forever, and the implications of US military presence throughout the continent should be considered sooner, rather than later.
Ultimately, the safekeeping of NATO vessels is a legal fiction that masks high stakes shift in a nation’s belligerent status. It attempts to gain the tactical advantages of military basing while maintaining the legal shields of civilian infrastructure, a contradiction that rarely survives the first missile. To protect the integrity of both international law and domestic safety, legislatures must demand formal Legal Impact Assessments for all basing and safekeeping agreements. Without these, civilian infrastructure remains a hidden liability.
Sources:
Mackinnon, A., 2026. Russia is helping Iran to target US military assets in Middle East. Financial Times, 6 March.
Mizzi, A., 2026. Rostock-Laage: German Armed Forces examine complete takeover of civilian infrastructure, s.l.: Aviation Direct.
RFI, 2026. How the war in Iran is testing Europe’s US military base network. Radio France Internationale, 4 March.
Ros, M., 2026. Sofia airport closes at night to civilian traffic as US military buildup grows, s.l.: Aero Time.
The Sofia Globe, 2026. Bulgarian Air Force F-16s in exercise at Sofia Airport. 10 March.
Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3.
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz, GG), Article 24(2) (International Integration/Collective Security).
Edited by Artyom Timofeev
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